Being different from the benchmark is not enough. Among highly active funds, research links a stable Active Share with stronger performance – a signal that selectors should not overlook.
The central conclusion
The most useful question may be not simply how active a manager is, but how consistently they remain active, where that active risk comes from and whether the fee is proportionate to the differentiation delivered.
Active management is evolving
Fund selectors face a growing paradox. Managers are sorted into style boxes and governed by tracking-error budgets, yet allocators are expected to anticipate which style, factor or risk regime will lead – and timing growth versus value, momentum versus quality, or concentrated versus diversified approaches is difficult. A framework designed to make managers easier to compare can thus turn the selector’s task from identifying durable investment skill into making a succession of factor calls.
This does not make style analysis or tracking error redundant; they simply answer only part of the question. Two portfolios can show similar relative volatility while taking fundamentally different decisions. One may be a diversified stock picker that offsets active positions across sectors; another may hold many benchmark names but make a few correlated sector or factor bets. Treating them as equivalent because their realised tracking error is similar risks confusing the amount of relative volatility with the source of that volatility.
That distinction is the starting point for the research reviewed here. Finance academics Martijn Cremers and Antti Petajisto introduced Active Share as a holdings-based measure of how much a portfolio differs from its benchmark. Their study of 2,647 US domestic equity funds from 1980-2003 argued that Active Share and tracking error capture different dimensions of active management: stock selection and systematic factor exposure respectively.1 Finance professors Aron Gottesman and Matthew Morey later examined US-based diversified emerging market equity funds from 2009-2014 and added an important refinement: among highly active funds, a consistent Active Share was associated with better outcomes than one that varied materially over time.2
A two-dimensional approach
Tracking error is the volatility of returns relative to a benchmark. Because correlated positions contribute heavily to portfolio variance, tracking error is particularly sensitive to systematic sector, industry and factor exposures. Active Share, by contrast, compares security weights with benchmark weights and gives equal emphasis to all active positions, whether or not they diversify one another. So, for example, a 0% active share would mean the portfolio is identical to the benchmark, while a 100% active share would mean a portfolio has no holdings in common with the benchmark. It is therefore a more direct measure of holdings differentiation and a useful proxy for stock selection.3
The measures are complementary. In the original Cremers and Petajisto study, a tracking error of 4%-6% was associated with Active Share anywhere between 30% and 100%. So a single tracking-error range encompassed near-benchmark portfolios, diversified stock pickers and highly differentiated strategies. Tracking error is not “wrong”, but because realised volatility shifts with market correlations and factor regimes, it can be a noisy guide to a strategy’s economic character. It should therefore not be treated as a stable label for manager conviction or as an expected-return target.
Figure 1: Two dimensions of active management
Lower tracking error | Higher tracking error | |
|---|---|---|
Higher Active Share | Diversified stock selection | Concentrated stock selection |
Lower Active Share | Closet indexing or index-like exposure | Factor and sector positions |
Source: Adapted from Cremers and Petajisto, 2009.
What the two principal studies found
The original US study found that funds in the highest Active Share group delivered stronger benchmark-relative performance than those in the lowest (before and after fees and transaction costs), and that the lowest Active Share group underperformed after expenses. Tracking error alone was not positively related to returns in the principal analysis. The finding should be read carefully: Active Share measures the opportunity to outperform through differentiation, not whether the underlying decisions are correct. Some Active Share is necessary for benchmark-relative alpha, but it is not sufficient.
The Gottesman and Morey emerging markets paper followed 67 funds with the MSCI Emerging Markets Index as their prospectus benchmark over 24 quarters from 2009-2014. Average Active Share was positively and significantly associated with contemporaneous performance on three measures: Sharpe ratio, single-index alpha (comparing solely to the benchmark) and four-index alpha (against the benchmark plus three additional factors). Expenses were negatively and significantly related to performance in the main regressions.
The most useful result from the study concerned consistency. After controlling for average Active Share and other fund characteristics, the standard deviation of each fund’s Active Share was negatively and significantly related to performance on all three measures. The relationship was strongest among highly active funds: those whose Active Share varied materially performed worse than those that maintained a more stable level of activeness.
High Active Share is therefore not the whole answer. The more discriminating signal in this sample was meaningful differentiation combined with consistency of implementation.
Why variability may matter
There are several plausible interpretations of this, none of which are proven by the metric alone. A stable Active Share may reflect a repeatable process, patience and a willingness to hold differentiated positions through difficult periods. High variability may point to regime timing, capacity constraints, process drift, benchmark anxiety or reactive de-risking after losses. Gottesman and Morey link consistency with conviction, but the observed relationship does not reveal the manager’s motivation.
The distinction matters for behavioural reasons. A discretionary manager may show strong conviction in calm markets, then move closer to the benchmark as volatility rises – precisely when valuation dispersion or forced selling may create opportunity. A systematic or rules-based process may limit that discretion, but activeness can still shift through rebalancing rules, changing opportunity sets or risk constraints. Selectors should test whether variability is an intended feature of the process or an unintended response to market stress.
Is Active Share itself declining?
The evidence is period- and universe-specific, so claiming a universal decline in Active Share would be too strong. Cremers and Petajisto documented a clear decline in their US sample: the share of mutual-fund assets with Active Share below 60% rose from 1.5% in 1980 to 44.8% in 2003, while the share above 80% fell from 42.8% to 23.3%. They attributed this to both the growth of index funds and a rise in closet indexing; the average Active Share of non-index large-cap funds fell from about 80% to 60% over the period.
The later emerging-markets paper points the other way. Gottesman and Morey found that the proportion of diversified emerging market funds with Active Share of 60% or less fell from roughly 30% in 2009 to about 11% in 2014. Within that sample, it was closet indexing that declined, not Active Share.
More recent research offers a potentially important explanation for why the historical relationship between Active Share and performance has appeared less favourable in US equities since 2010. Rather than blaming deteriorating manager skill, a 2026 working paper by finance PhD student Hannah Unterberg at the Paul Merage School of Business, University of California, Irvine, argues that the sustained shift of capital from active to passive funds created flow-induced price pressure. Stocks overweighted by active managers faced selling as active funds suffered outflows, while passive inflows mechanically supported securities at benchmark weights. Once these flows were controlled for, the negative relationship between Active Share and performance became statistically insignificant.4
This is especially relevant when market cap-weighted indices are unusually concentrated. The 10 largest companies represented approximately 38% of the S&P 500 in mid-2026, leaving index outcomes heavily dependent on a handful of stocks. Yet performance can vary widely between companies in the same market or sector, creating opportunities for active stock selection.
Maintaining substantial benchmark differentiation in such an environment requires conviction and a willingness to tolerate periods when passive flows reinforce the largest index positions. That same differentiation could prove valuable if market leadership broadens or yesterday’s winners cease to dominate. Active Share therefore remains a useful diagnostic of portfolio differentiation and consistency of conviction.
A selector’s dashboard
Diagnostic | What to review | What it may reveal |
|---|---|---|
Active Share | Current level, average, range and standard deviation | Degree and consistency of holdings differentiation |
Tracking error | Ex ante and ex post; rolling windows | Magnitude of relative return volatility |
Risk attribution | Stock, sector, country, currency and factor contributions | Whether returns depend on stock selection or regime calls |
Holdings overlap | Top active weights, exclusions and benchmark overlap | Economic substance behind the headline metrics |
Turnover and holding period | Turnover, transaction costs and average holding period | Patience, implementation drag and possible process instability |
Fees and capacity | OCF, trading costs, AUM and liquidity | Whether alpha potential is diluted by cost or scale |
From research to portfolio design: the CT QR Series
The studies do not validate any individual product and should not be presented as doing so, but they do offer a useful lens on the design choices behind the CT QR Series Active ETFs.
The strategies start with a benchmark universe, apply customised quantitative models that rank companies against relevant peers, and retain the more highly rated securities subject to investment and sustainability criteria. Portfolio construction seeks to express stock-level views while limiting unintended sector, regional and country biases. The portfolios are recalibrated semi-annually and monitored between rebalances for material downgrades.5
This is benchmark awareness rather than benchmark replication: the benchmark defines the opportunity set, while security selection creates differentiation. From a high level, the portfolio is designed to retain the broad shape of the benchmark, while looking very different at the individual stock level. This means stock selection, rather than macro or factor calls, is intended to be the primary source of relative return.
The ETF documentation describe expected tracking error of roughly 2%-4% for much of the range and historical Active Share generally within approximately 40%-70%, varying by strategy.
The connection to the discussed research is conceptual: measurable portfolio differentiation, a moderate tracking-error range and a repeatable process intended to maintain Active Share through changing markets. The test for selectors remains empirical: does the strategy continue to deliver the stated type of active risk with consistent implementation and costs commensurate with the differentiation provided?
The bottom line
Fund selection should not be reduced to choosing the manager with the highest Active Share or the largest tracking-error budget. The evidence supports a more demanding framework. Active Share reveals how much a portfolio differs from its benchmark; tracking error describes the volatility and results of those differences. Together, they help distinguish stock selection from factor timing. The emerging markets study adds a crucial insight: among highly active funds, consistency in activeness was associated with stronger performance, and variability with poorer outcomes.
For fund selectors, the practical implication is straightforward. Look for a credible source of alpha, meaningful holdings differentiation, an explicable and reasonably stable level of activeness, limited unintended factor dependence, disciplined implementation and fees that do not absorb the value of the active decisions. The aim is not maximum difference from the benchmark. It is purposeful, persistent and measurable difference.